Monthly Archives: July 2013

How Tim Kaine Can Boost the Peace Process

Originally published in The Daily Beast on July 31, 2013.

Freshman Senator Tim Kaine’s (D-VA) rise to the chairmanship of the prestigious Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Middle East panel could represent a boon to a nascent peace-process. Though subtle, the shift might best be encapsulated by comparing Kaine to his predecessor: he’ll succeed outgoing chair Sen. Bob Casey (D-PA). Casey, for example, frequently declares that Jerusalem must forever remain the eternal, undivided capital of the state of Israel—a non-starter for the Palestinians, who want the eastern part of the city as the capital of their future state.

The subcommittee that Kaine will lead handles matters involving U.S. relations with the countries of the Middle East and Arab North Africa. But how important is a Senate committee in a policy area where the White House sets policy and the House of Representatives controls the purse strings? “The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has a limited legislative role,” said Norman Ornstein, an expert on Congress with the American Enterprise Institute. “But it has a long and historic and prestigious role overseeing U.S. foreign policy.” Ornstein expounded on that role: “A subcommittee can hold hearings, call witnesses, spotlight issues and controversies, meet with foreign leaders, and influence public opinion and at times an administration. So this is, especially now, a key subcommittee and a real spotlight for Kaine.”

Kaine comes with a strong background in U.S. politics: he served as the mayor of Richmond from 1998 to 2001; as the Governor of Virginia from 2006 to 2010; and as the Chairperson of the Democratic National Committee from 2009 to 2011.  When he won his senate seat in 2012, it was one of the tightest races in the country. 

Notably, Kaine is now a J Street PAC endorsed candidate. According to J Street’s website, “Kaine speaks of himself as a Truman Democrat,” with a commitment to making Israel a long lasting, safe and secure home for the Jewish people, and one that exists at peace with its Palestinian neighbors. J Street released a statement Monday congratulating Kaine for his appointment, reaffirming the “grand tradition of Truman Democrats.” 

New Republic senior editor John Judis, whose forthcoming book “Genesis: Truman, American Jews, and the Origins of the Arab/Israeli Conflict” explores the role the U.S. played in the repeated failed attempts at negotiating peace, explained that being a “Truman Democrat” might not quite describe what people today believe it does. Despite the “popular perception” of Truman as the man who first recognized the state of Israel and the immense praise he garnered after leaving the presidency, Judis noted, Truman’s relationship with Israel was actually much more complicated at the time. Judis continued:

During the first years of [Truman’s] presidency, and even after he had granted recognition to the new state, Truman was ambivalent about supporting a Jewish state, which he identified at one point with a theocracy, and would have preferred some kind of arrangement that would have accommodated Jews and Arabs within one state or a federated state.  

However, Judis remarked that he’s sure this is not the Truman that Kaine self-identifies with.

Kaine could be boosted by his subcommittee, a bastion of support for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. This past March 27 senators signed a letter authored by Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) calling for a sustained U.S. diplomatic initiative to help forge a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians based on a two-state solution; Casey didn’t sign it, but Kaine did. Moreover, Sens. Barbara Boxer (D-CA), Jean Shaheen (D-NH) and Chris Coons (D-DE), three other senators on the Middle East subcommittee also signed on.  About a quarter of the Senate added their names to support a strong U.S. leadership in negotiating a two-state solution, but forty percent of the Senate subcommittee on the Middle East now has. That’s substantial.

Kaine’s also proven himself a friend of Israel—during his governorship he oversaw an initiative promoting bilateral cooperation and increased commercial ties between Virginia and Israel. But, unlike Casey, that record doesn’t include support for every “pro-Israel” initiative making its way through Congress. In March, the United States-Israel Strategic Partnership Act picked up 50 cosponsors—Kaine not among them. The controversial bill included provisions such as inviting Israel into the visa waiver program without requiring them to provide reciprocal travel privileges for U.S. citizens due to “security concerns.” Critics of the bill contended that it would codify discrimination against U.S. citizens of Arab, Muslim and especially Palestinian descent.

The peace process, which formally resumed after an Iftar dinner on Monday night in Washington, will require sustained political support in Congress over the coming months. John Kerry and his team’s future efforts will largely be impacted by the extent to which they’re taken seriously by Israelis and Palestinians during negotiations. Haaretz’s Barak Ravid, in describing Kerry’s diplomacy in Israel, said Kerry “embraced and supported, but knew how to pressure and to threaten.” Building support in positions of Congressional leadership for this tack will prove important in sending a message that the United States is serious about these negotiations.

Kaine could be just the man to take up that campaign on the Hill.

What Should We Expect From Martin Indyk?

Originally published in The Daily Beast on July 24, 2013.

Ignore those who dismiss Martin Indyk as just another AIPAC guy unconcerned with a viable two-state solution; they haven’t done their research. There’s a reason that right-wing Danny Danon is so nervous that Secretary of State John Kerry might appoint Indyk to oversee the new Israeli-Palestinian peace talks—and why he sent a letter to Netanyahu arguing that Indyk is no “honest broker.” But with the buzz about Indyk’s likely appointment, a reasonable question is, well, what should we expect?

As a pundit, Indyk, who served twice as U.S. Ambassador to Israel and is now Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, left behind a hefty paper trail. In 2009, Indyk published Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American Peacemaking Diplomacy in the Middle East, which provides a window into his experiences working to negotiate deals with Israelis, Palestinians and Syrians; it notably includes reflections on the mishaps and strategic blunders that derailed such deals. This, coupled with op-eds he has published over the past decade gives us a decent idea of how this man might now behave around a negotiating table.

For starters, we can expect Indyk to be tougher on Israelis than past American diplomats have been. This is promising since he already has established trust with Israel from his ambassadorship. Even so, we can still expect Arab parties to feel frustrated with the American diplomatic approach. Indyk writes that the “easier and more effective” approach to peacemaking will inevitably be perceived by some as showing greater loyalty to Israel than to Palestine. But Indyk argues that “the Arabs cannot have it both ways” and if they’d like to see the U.S. use its influence with Israel then “they should not complain” when that effort means a coordinated response. While histrionic pressure “may provide psychic satisfaction” to Palestinians, it will do nothing serious to make Israel more willing to take the necessary risks needed to relinquish territory.

Indyk writes about how in the past, the United States was too innocent and unsuspecting of ulterior motives that leaders vying for power in Middle Eastern politics had. “It was typical of our naïveté that we never expected Rabin would use U.S. influence for his own purposes,” he writes when reflecting on the failures of Oslo. He argues that the U.S. was blind to the actors and events that disrupted their strategic plans, and that going forward, a more realist approach is needed. “[We showed] a troubling naïveté in the American approach to the Middle East that is in part innocence, part ignorance, and part arrogance.”

Indyk also believes that the United States was soft, “continually backing down” at Camp David–thus ruining their hopes of showing Israelis and Palestinians that they could lead tough negotiations. “Barak and Arafat could only interpret this as a sign of weakness. Unfortunately this would become a familiar pattern.” This time around, hopefully, Indyk has learned his lesson.

We can also expect these talks to be as discreet and private as possible, marking a shift from the public fanfare of previous United States efforts. Indyk notes that “leaks are the lifeblood of the Israeli political system” and that any successful future peace process will necessitate “toning down the rhetoric and allowing the results of American diplomacy to speak for themselves.”

Indyk certainly believes that resolving this conflict is in America’s interest—he sees it directly connected to the strength of America’s bargaining position with the countries in the Persian Gulf. In a sharp New York Times op-ed published in 2010, Indyk criticized Netanyahu for his absence at a U.S. led nuclear security summit to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions, arguing that “the real reason” for Netanyahu’s absence was that he was avoiding Obama, who had demanded a settlement freeze in East Jerusalem. Indyk notes that if Netanyahu continues to blow off Obama in favor of Likudniks who oppose peace, “the consequences for U.S.-Israel relations could be dire.”

Indyk also deeply understands some of some of the most seemingly intractable issues of this conflict, namely Jerusalem. Ehud Barak has preached for years now that “the real Arafat” revealed himself at Camp David—a leader who lacked the character to make a historic compromise and who was secretly just looking for the demise of the Jewish state. Indyk categorically rejects this.  “Camp David was hardly a good laboratory for that proposition,” he writes in his book. “It was not reasonable to expect that Arafat, or any Arab leader for that matter, would agree to an end-of-conflict agreement that left sovereignty over the Haram al-Sharif in Israeli hands forever.” Later, he also explicitly affirms that Camp David negotiations did not break down over the issue of right of return, despite plenty of rumors.

The timetable on these negotiations is unclear. On the one hand, Indyk says that going forward, goals must be more “modest” and assumptions more “realistic.” But we also should not expect this process to take years, squeezed into the final weeks and days of Obama’s term, like we saw with Clinton’s. Indyk argues, “An attempt to reach a Middle Eastern agreement in the last year of a president’s second term is probably the worst timing of all.” He recognizes that how a president hands over policy to the next administration is critically important to its ultimate survival.

Whether or not Kerry will manage to pull off bringing Israelis and Palestinians to direct negotiations remains to be seen. However, with Martin Indyk’s track record and experience working on this issue, assuming he listens to his own advice, it seems that he might be a pretty good choice.

Arab Spring Keeps Sending Hamas Packing

Originally published in The Daily Beast on July 12, 2013.

The Arab uprisings that have for more than two years roiled the Middle East and North Africa must by now bring a sense of disquiet to Hamas, the Palestinian group that holds up “resistance”—often with terrorist tactics—against Israel. The group’s exiled leadership was already displaced by the Syrian civil war, and lost a key backer in Iran over sectarian tensions. Since January 2012, Hamas’s leadership has been based in both Cairo and Doha. 

Now the latest tumult in Egypt that unseated Mohammed Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood government again took away access to an allied Islamist group with state power. While analysts disagree on how swimmingly the relationship between the Brotherhood and Hamas was going, they believe Hamas will be sent packing again with the group’s ouster.

“The idea that the Muslim Brotherhood was a gift to Hamas and that they worked together closely is nonsense. It’s absolute nonsense,” said Mark Perry, a journalist and expert on Middle Eastern terror groups, in an interview. “But the situation right now is without question much worse. We’re in a very revolutionary situation in Egypt. And the coup in Egypt—that’s what it was—was not good for Hamas.”

In this volatile see-saw for Hamas’ leadership—sending them careening between various Arab capitals, vulnerable to each country’s fluctuating and unstable political situation—it’s not entirely clear where Hamas will go.

“I think Hamas will continue to operate out of Qatar,” said Perry. “I don’t think it’s any question that it would be very difficult to operate out of Cairo for now, but the future is very much in the air. What’s going on there isn’t over by a long shot.”

David Pollack, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, agreed, but said even the natural gas-rich Gulf Arab sheikhdom may not provide a stable home. “I’d guess Qatar, but sadly Tunisia is also possible, or even Turkey at times,” he said. “Qatar is having second thoughts [about supporting Hamas]. It’s not clear just yet, and they certainly haven’t announced it, but it seems that for Qatar, things are crumbling around them, whether it’s the Syrian opposition or the events in Egypt. Their earlier idea of rebuilding Gaza is just not happening.”Hamas conducted strategic operations from Jordan until 1999, when Jordanian King Abdullah accused the Sunni Islamist group of engaging in illegal activities and attempting to harm the peace treaty between his country and Israel. Jordan expelled Hamas Chief Khaled Meshaal, reportedly at the request of Israel, the United States and the Palestinian Authority, and he moved briefly to Qatar. In 2001, he resettled in the Syrian capital and for the next eleven years the Hamas political bureau would operate out of Damascus. The Syrian government provided the group a safe haven, weapons and financial support for an armed struggle against Israel.The killings of some 7,000 Sunni Syrians in March of 2011 by predominately Alawite security forces forced Hamas to take a stand. Despite their initial attempts to remain neutral, the group ultimately came out against the Assad regime, and thus faced the wrath of the Syrian and Iranian governments. 

Beginning in 2012, it was clear it was no longer feasible for Hamas to operate in Damascus. Deputy Political Leader Moussa Abu Marzouk moved to Cairo and Khaled Meshaal and his aides moved to Doha. The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood to political power after the revolution provided an ostensible ally—Hamas has roots in the Egyptian Brotherhood. 

But the Brotherhood proved a less-than-stalwart adherent to Hamas’s agenda. When Morsi was elected in June 2012, one of his first promises was to fully open the Rafah crossing, which separates Egypt from the Gaza Strip, where Hamas has ruled since a violent counter-coup in 2007. “For most Palestinians, Rafah is more than a crossing—it is a symbol for the isolated Gaza Strip’s contact with the outside world,” reported McClatchy.  But while loosening travel restrictions and allowing individuals to more easily cross, Morsi never fulfilled his pledge of a full opening.

Egyptian public opinion has soured substantially towards Gaza, compared to the beginning of the revolution. Many Egyptians blamed Hamas members for instability in the Sinai Peninsula. In April, Egyptian soldiers and officers were abducted there, and Hamas was accused of the kidnapping. Hamas denied the allegations, but the situation amplified rising negative sentiments. Other Egyptians hold a general frustration at their leaders for what they see as a trend of helping Gazans instead of their own citizens. A 23-year-old Egyptian student, Ala Mafrouk, who took part in the Tahrir Square protests, told McClatchy, the Brotherhood “sends things to Gaza which we do not have in Egypt. We want to get rid of Morsi and get a new leader who puts Egypt first.”

Hamas’s troubles are compounded by its remaining roster of potential allies and hosts. Hamas has “only two patrons left, and both are Western allies that could be tempted to throw Hamas under the bus for greater financial or political incentives,” wrote Foundation For Defense of Democracies vice president Jonathan Schanzer. Meshaal’s expulsion from Jordan a decade and a half ago gives weight to Schanzer’s warning.Just last year, it seemed as if Hamas—with the Brotherhood dominating Egyptian electoral politics—might be ascendant. But for now, at least, the tumult in the Middle East appears to have left the group adrift.

Andrew Pochter Was Not ‘Delusional’

Originally published in The Daily Beast on July 3, 2012. 
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It was with incredible sadness that I learned about the death of 21-year-old Andrew Pochter. He was raised in Maryland, studied at Kenyon, and traveled to Egypt to teach English to children for the summer. On Friday he was fatally stabbed in a protest against Mohamed Morsi in Alexandria.

The death of any civilian is terrible. And still, his hit especially close to home for me.

Andrew and I were the same age, grew up in similar towns, were both active in our campus Hillels, and both cared deeply about the happenings in the Middle East. I never met him, but our shared values and upbringings made me react to his death in a particularly visceral way. I just finished my junior year and had so many smart, interesting and idealistic friends study abroad in various Middle Eastern countries. It could have been me. It could have been any of them.

That was why reading Batya and Yisrael Medad’s posts about the death of Andrew Pochter made my skin crawl. For background: Yisrael Medad is a regular contributor to The Jerusalem Post, a member of the Executive Board of Israel’s Media Watch, and a foreign media spokesperson for the settlers’ Yesha Council of Jewish Communities. His wife, Batya, is a newspaper columnist and lives with him in the settlement of Shiloh in the northern West Bank.

In The Jewish Press, Batya wrote an outrageous post entitled, “Why Was Andrew Pochter in Egypt, Not Israel?” She asks, “Are you disturbed by the fact that an American Jewish student is more attracted to Arab society than to Jewish Israeli society?” She wonders if Andrew’s parents “supported his delusion” that he could make a difference in Egypt. And, in the wake of his death, she even asks whether Andrew realized there is “better medical care” in Israel. It “bothers” her that Jewish Americans would truly care about countries other than Israel in the Middle East.

Batya Medad found the situation “disturbing,” but for reasons very different from why I felt so disturbed by Andrew’s death.

Her husband published an equally reprehensible post entitled “Pochter’s Past Left Him No Future.” He snidely points out that Andrew was raised in a family with both Jewish and Christian parents, and concludes:

  • Unfortunately, there are too many American Jewish students with:
  • – no proper knowledge of the Middle East, Arab culture and Islamist custom;
  • – too much enthusiasm and passion;
  • – a progressive/liberal outlook;
  • – too little Jewish background.

Andrew Pochter’s death came far too soon, but he will not die in vain. His life represents the hope of a better, more compassionate and just future. The Medads and others like them still see the world through an “us versus them” prism, still refuse to see how people in the Middle East are interconnected, and still oppose Jewish American interest in any Middle Eastern country other than Israel. But Andrew’s memory, volunteerism, leadership and activism will continue to inspire and guide the rest of us left to further the work he recognized was so important. And I sincerely hope Batya and Yisrael will one day realize that the events, people and conditions in other countries can and will directly impact the events, people and conditions in their own lives. If they refuse to accept this, then they are the ones who are delusional.

Seeing it For Myself: Injustice In the South Hebron Hills

Originally published in The Daily Beast on July 2, 2013. 

Last summer, I traveled with a J Street U delegation to the South Hebron Hills, in the southernmost reaches of the West Bank. Gazing out from an agricultural Palestinian village, we could see two unauthorized Israeli “outpost” settlements, recently erected a few hundred feet away. We saw the outposts’ electrical system and learned they’d been hooked up to a water supply; the Palestinian villagers had neither. This was the face of inequity in Israeli-controlled areas of the West Bank.

Twenty years ago, the Oslo Accords divided the West Bank into three parts. On nearly two-thirds of the land, designated as Area C, Israel retained full control—and with that full responsibility for the Palestinians living there. But those Palestinians, who make up about five percent of the territory’s population, do not receive the same services as their Jewish neighbors, who’ve moved in droves into the Israeli settlements that now dot the area. Over the past twenty years, in short, the state of Israel has shirked its responsibilities.

Last month, B’Tselem, an Israeli rights group working in the West Bank, published a new report entitled “Acting the Landlord: Israel’s Policy in Area C, The West Bank.”The report points to a wider effect of Israel’s policies in the areas it controls. “In theory, Israel retains full control in the West Bank only of Area C,” a release for the report said. “In practice, Israel’s control of Area C adversely affects all Palestinian West Bank residents.”

According to B’Tselem, Israeli policy works to serve the water and land needs of Israelis at the expense of the Palestinians. As the group sees it, Israel created a de facto annexation of Area C, and now works to make that a permanent reality through the expansion of settlements.

But water and power are only two concerns: the report also covers the continuing expulsion of Palestinians from their homes. Citing residents who live in South Hebron Hills that the IDF Civil Administration—the Israeli military authority for West Bank Palestinians—refuses to formally recognize, the report states, “Over 1,000 people… currently live under the perpetual threat of expulsion on the grounds of residing in a ‘firing zone.’”

According to Haaretz, the High Court of Justice is now due to consider Israel’s demand to annul a 13-year-old temporary injunction which allowed farmers in the South Hebron Hills to remain in their homes. Israel demanded the expulsion of approximately 1,300 Palestinians, arguing that the IDF needs that land to train in what they designate as “Firing Zone 918.”

This firing zone rationale is a major threat for Palestinians living in Area C. In July 2012, Defense Minister Ehud Barak stated that the area was essential for the IDF’s training, and that Palestinian residents living in eight out of 12 villages must evacuate their homes. The four other villages, located next to illegal Israeli settlement outposts, like the one I visited, were not ordered to evacuate. ACRI, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, filed a petition in response to Barak’s demand.

“It is inconceivable that 1,000 people should be evicted for the sake of military exercises. These evictions, which are tantamount to forced displacement, deny the villagers their livelihood and seize the property of people whose very existence depends upon the land they cultivate,” said Tamar Feldman, an attorney with ACRI, in a statement in January.

Due to the work of ACRI and others, Palestinian villagers won a temporary reprieve from the large-scale eviction. However, their quality of life is highly restricted. The Civil Administration forbids all forms of development, including projects like securing water and electrical systems, setting up additional tents, and digging for water wells.

NGO’s do what they can. COMET-ME is one that helps provide solar and wind power to Palestinians in these areas—but restrictions and changes in status make their work precarious. Without building permits, their projects stand to be wiped away at any moment. That’s because Israel rarely issues such. A study conducted by Peace Now found that, between 2000-2007, 94 percent of Palestinian building permit applications were turned down.

Traveling in the South Hebron Hills, I saw for myself the indefensible conditions in which these Palestinians live, adjacent to Israelis with full water and electricity access. Those who claim liberal outlets like Haaretz and rights groups like B’Tselem take too dour a view of Israeli motives and goals, should see it for themselves, too. Because when one looks over at the land, it’s impossible to ignore the inequities of Israel’s occupation.